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1. Introduction 
Price discrimination is consistent with profit maximizing behavior. Discrimination based on ethnicity 
is inconsistent with societal norms as expressed in national and international law. Housing is a 
necessity and therefore the price of rental housing is economically interesting and socially important. 
In this paper, we study how price discrimination can lead to racial discrimination in the rental market. 
Price formation in rental markets can be viewed as a signaling game. There is a tension between a 
profit-maximizing landlord’s need to judge the rental risk of each contract signed. This tension may 
result in a market equilibrium that is privately optimal but socially undesirable. 
 
The study of discrimination has a long and distinguished pedigree in economics. This paper is the first 
to empirically investigate discrimination in the context of a European rental market. Moreover, we 
make two additional contributions. We apply the theory of statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972) to 
rental markets. Compared with other markets where statistical discrimination may occur, rental 
markets are particularly well suited to empirical study.  Finally, we examine a large sample of existing 
rental contracts and dwelling units, which allows us to quantify the magnitude of discrimination in 
equilibrium, in contrast to the audit approach taken by much of the previous work on discrimination in 
rental markets. 
 
Statistical discrimination is most likely to be observed in markets where agent type influences the 
profitability of a transaction.  Examples include markets for labor, health, insurance and housing. Most 
of the previous work has focused on discrimination the labor market, beginning with the work of 
Arrow (1973), Becker (1957), and Phelps (1972). Heckman (1997)makes clear that identifying 
discrimination in the labor market is difficult. Disadvantaged groups may expect lower returns on 
educational investments and as a result invest less in education in equilibrium. Because of this, 
econometric studies in this area confront a serious endogeneity problem; the effects of statistical 
discrimination and unobserved differences in skill are confounded. A priori, rental markets seem 
somewhat less plagued by this kind of endogeneity problem. Being a good tenant requires some skill, 
such as paying rent on time and not damaging the property, but these are not likely to be directly 
conditional on previous investments in “tenancy skills”. This makes the rental market an interesting 
alternative to labor markets for the study of statistical discrimination.  
 
Ethnic minority groups are present in Europe, but their genesis is starkly different from the American 
example. As a result, it is unclear how much of the literature developed in a US context is applicable 
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to Europe. Recent migration to Europe has produced new minority groups and members of these 
groups report discrimination. In contrast to the US case, members of these groups reached Europe 
largely by choice. They may have been fleeing from oppressive regimes, or simply be pursuing better 
economic outcomes. Put differently, they have largely self-selected into a given European country.  
 
Understanding the role of discrimination in a European context is important. European countries 
typically have well-developed welfare systems.  The effect of discrimination in the context of a 
generous welfare state is an open research question (Nannestad 2007). On the one hand, the presence 
of a generous social welfare system may mitigate the costs of discrimination as borne by individual 
members of the group. On the other hand, it may exacerbate the costs of discrimination as born by 
society as a whole. 
 
In this paper we analyze data from Norway.  Norway is particularly well suited to the study of 
discrimination because until recently, Norway was a linguistically and ethnically homogeneous 
country with little history of immigration.  Moreover, Norway does not have a colonial history; the 
recent influx of non-western immigrants is a novel phenomenon and is not the result of a long 
endogenous historical process. The result is a relatively clean social experiment where the presence of 
past discrimination is less likely to confound the evidence for current discrimination.1 
 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the literature on statistical discrimination.  Based 
on the existing literature, which largely relates to discrimination in labor markets, we then propose a 
stylized model of statistical discrimination in the rental market. The theory provides the basis for our 
empirical specification.  We investigate the implications of our model using a new dataset that 
provides a large and detailed sample of the Norwegian rental market. We then attempt to exclude 
several competing theories that could explain differences in rent by ethnic group. The final section 
concludes. 
2. Statistical Discrimination 
Racial discrimination can manifest itself in different ways. Discrimination may be overt, e.g. refusing 
to initiate a transaction if a person is of an undesired group.  It may also be subtle, e.g. being less 
accommodating or less willing to negotiate prices for members of certain groups.  Finally, 
discrimination may be the result of the disparate impact of policy if for example, commercial practices 
                                                     
1 See Lundberg and Startz (1998) provide a theoretical justification for the persistence of racial inequality. 
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or laws that disproportionately harm certain groups (Marsden 1994). If opportunities for success and 
achievement are due to ascriptive differences, then equality of opportunity is compromised (Roemer 
1998). Disparate treatment of this type is expected to yield statistically different outcomes at the mean 
when two groups differ only by an ascribed difference. However, detecting these differences poses 
nontrivial econometric challenges. The idea of ceteris paribus comparisons, is uniquely challenging 
when comparing different ethnic groups (Heckman 1998). We now briefly describe the literature of 
discrimination in labor, rental and housing markets. 
Labor markets 
The study of discrimination has its origins in the study of labor market outcomes (Becker 1957; Arrow 
1973; Phelps 1972).  The theory attributes differences in labor market outcomes for otherwise 
comparable members of different to different, though not mutually exclusive, causes.  The first, where 
an agent acts “as if he were willing to pay something either directly or in the form of reduced income 
to be associated with some persons instead of others” (Becker 1957) is called a taste for 
discrimination. The competing theoretical framework, called statistical discrimination, is driven by the 
presence of differences between groups when the relevant characteristic of an individual group 
member is not easily observed (Phelps 1972). For example, if an agent is paid the group wage and not 
the marginal value of their productivity, the result is statistical discrimination. Does statistical 
discrimination lead to market inefficiencies? Schwab (1986) shows, that statistical information does 
not necessarily allocate resources more efficiently than in a case where firms ignore such information.  
 
A central focus of the empirical work in this area has been the study of discrimination against African 
Americans in the US labor market. The consensus seems to be that discrimination is present in this 
case. However, the use of market data to test for discrimination has been the source of controversy. 
Heckman (1998) remarks: 
The impact of market discrimination is not determined by most discriminatory participants in 
the market, or even by the average level of discrimination among firms, but rather at the level of 
discrimination at the firms where ethnic minorities end up buying, working and borrowing. 
Heckman’s critique is particularly pressing as regards the heterogeneous US labor market. Salaries 
paid to the same occupation can vary substantially across industries and across regions. If ethnic 
background varies across industries more or less by chance, the effects of discrimination will be 
confounded and estimates of wage discrimination will be biased.  
 
Another serious empirical challenge is linked to a debate on the efficiency of discrimination. In an 
efficient labor market, workers earn their efficiency wage, that is, a wage that reflects the market value 
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of their true skill level. On the other hand, investments in skill both observed and unobserved, are 
likely to be conditional on anticipated future returns. If members of a given group believe they face 
lower returns to skill in the future, they will invest less in the present. In this scenario, a serious 
endogeneity problem arises. It is hard to distinguish how much of the wage differential that is due to 
statistical discrimination and how much is due to unobserved differences in skill.  
 
There exists a smaller literature that examines the rate at which the labor market earnings of 
immigrants converges to the average of non-immigrants in the host country (Chiswick 1978). This 
literature has found that over the course of 10 to 15 years, immigrants’ earnings tend to converge to 
mean.  As with the literature on discrimination in labor markets, comparable endogeneity issues arise. 
Immigrants are extremely heterogeneous in their labor market skills making identification difficult. 
Moreover, the arrival of particular groups tends to be clustered in time, which makes disentangling 
group specific effects from assimilation effects difficult (Borjas (1985, 1995)). While some work has 
been done on assimilation in Europe, as was the case for the literature on discrimination, most of the 
empirical examples are drawn from the United States. 
Discrimination in Housing Markets 
Discrimination in housing market has been the focus of much research by the U.S. government. This 
has focused on experimental approaches in which an auditor, posing as a potential tenant or buyer, 
attempts to transact with a landlord or a real estate agent. The causal relationship between ethnicity 
and discrimination is established by varying group membership of the auditors. Yinger (1986) studies 
Fair Housing Audits, and finds disparate treatment of minorities in both rental and sales audits. 
Discrimination takes the form of different information about the number of potential houses, 
information about asking prices and financing being provided to prospective tenants or buyers of 
different races. Choi et al. (2005) consider an updated sample and find that while discrimination has 
declined relative to earlier analyses, it is still present. This kind of disparate treatment yields higher 
costs of information resulting in higher housing or rental costs.  However, audit studies are expensive.  
Moreover they do not establish the price premium faced by members of a disadvantaged group in a 
market equilibrium.  In this paper, we use a sample of existing rental contracts in order to establish the 
relative price difference faced by a disadvantaged group. 
 
Yinger (1998) and Dymski (2001) provide overviews of discrimination in housing markets. 
Interestingly, neither survey references much research on markets outside the United States, and 
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references no research on discrimination in European housing markets.  In contrast, we believe our 
paper is the first to focus on discrimination in a European rental market. 
3.  A stylized model of statistical discrimination in the rental 
market 
The rental market is fertile ground for complex signaling games whose equilibria may result in 
statistical discrimination. The relationship between landlord and tenant can be lengthy and a good 
match benefits both parties.  However, both landlord and tenant have different objectives and face 
different risks. The tenant faces potential risks regarding attributes of the dwelling that may not be 
readily observable on first inspection. The landlord faces a complex mix of risks: Will the tenant pay 
on time? Take good care of the dwelling? How long will they stay? A potential result of this signaling 
game is a rental contract.  
 
We follow the lines of statistical discrimination as described in Phelps (1972) for labor market 
outcomes. We assume that landlords have some beliefs over tenant type given an observed set of 
socio-demographic characteristics. These can be justified in the sense that they reflect true differences 
between groups, or they may be unjustified and prejudiced. In what follows we do not attempt to 
distinguish between these causes, though they may differ with regard to their impact on economic 
efficiency. 
 
Assume landlords have heterogeneous preferences with respect the risk/return tradeoff. Each landlord 
j, can rent out dwelling unit k, which yields an expected monthly return of ( )kE r  with variance 
( )var kr . Heterogeneous landlords have different attitudes towards risk and will rank bundles of first 
and second order moments of returns differently. We model this by assuming a twice continuously 
differentiable concave (sub) utility function U that depends on the first and second moments of the 
distribution of returns: 
 ( ) ( )( ), varj jU U E r r= . 
We assume that utility is increasing in expected monthly return and decreasing in variance. 
 
Assume that the first and second moments of the distribution of rental returns of the dwelling unit are 
functions of the terms of the contract, kL  in particular on the contracted price Kp , and finally on 
expected tenant behavior.  Further, assume that tenants can be partitioned into G groups based on 
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observable characteristics.  Each tenant, indexed by i, belongs to a single group denoted gi. Finally the 
value gi is common knowledge. In summary, the landlord knows that the first and second order 
moments of the distribution of rental return are functions of monthly rental, kp , other contractual 
terms, kL , and group membership gi.  Formally, the landlord considers, the first and second moments 
of the distribution of returns 
 ( ) ( )( ), , , ,k i k i k k iE r E r p L g= , 
 ( ) ( )( ), ,var var , ,k i k i k k ir r p L g= . 
Each landlord also has the option to sell the unit rather than renting it out.  In this model, the decision 
to sell (e.g. not rent) fixes the landlord’s reservation price in the rental market. If the landlord decides 
to sell, the expected monthly return (abstracting from transaction costs) is ( )kE r  with variance 
( )var kr . A landlord j will rent out a dwelling unit to a tenant from group i if and only if, the utility 
from renting to a member of group i, with a rental contract characterized by price kp  and other 
contractual terms kL , exceeds the reservation utility obtained from selling the apartment, 
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), , ,, , , var , , , varj i k i k k i k i k k i j k kU E r p L g r p L g U E r r≥ . 
The tenant’s choice problem is relatively straightforward. Tenants are assumed to have well-behaved 
separable utility functions defined over housing consumption cH and other consumption cO.  We can 
write the utility of tenant i as, 
 ( ),i i H OU U c c=  
Further the hedonic characteristics of rental object k are denoted xk, and as before Lk are contract 
specific terms, 
 ( ),H H k kc c x L= . 
We do not make any strong assumptions about how contracting occurs.  If we observe a completed 
contract for dwelling unit k by a tenant from group i, then there exists a reservation price kp , such that 
the maximization of tenant utility ( ),i i H OU U c c=  yields a willingness to pay for the dwelling unit 
greater than the landlord’s reservation price. As a result a rental contract is signed and the unit is 
rented for a rental price of ,k i kp p≥ . When a rental contract is agreed to, the observed market rental 
price for object k can be summarized by 
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 ( ), , ,k i K k k ip p x L g= . 
This equation motivates the empirical work that follows.  We turn now to a description of our unique 
data source and then describe our empirical approach. 
4. Data 
The presence (or absence) of statistical discrimination in rental markets is an empirical question. In 
this section we discuss the survey and administrative data that provides the basis for our analysis.  A 
detailed survey of the Norwegian rental stock wwew conducted as a part of the constructing the 
consumer price index.  Information on the hedonic characteristics of each apartment was collected, as 
was information on the rental contract characteristics and some demographic information about the 
tenant.  We were able to link tenants to information in Statistics Norway register of all residents in 
Norway, which allows us to determine whether or not they are Norwegian by birth and if not, their 
country of origin.  In what follows we refer to these groups as Norwegian and Non-Norwegians 
respectively.Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for the two groups respect. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics for Tenants by Country of Birth 
Norwegian 
(n=2474) 
Non-Norwegian 
(n=414) 
Female 49.8 % 38.2% 
Age 34.1 34.5 
Univesity Degree 4.3% 41.3% 
Oslo 33.6% 53.6% 
Single 52.7% 46.1% 
Living with Spouse 34.3% 43.2% 
Living with Kids 3.5% 6.5% 
Living with Parents 0.4% 0.2% 
Living with Siblings 1.3% 2.2% 
Living with Friends 9.3% 7.5% 
 
There are a couple of notable differences between the groups. The most striking difference is that 
Non-Norwegian tenants have on average significantly higher education than native Norwegians. Non-
Norwegians are also more likely to live in Oslo, are less likely to be single, are more likely to be living 
with a spouse, a sibling and/or children, but are less likely to be living with friends. 
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Table 4.2 Hedonic Attributes of Dwelling Units by Country of Birth 
 
Norwegian 
(n=2474) 
Non-Norwegian 
(n=414) 
City Center 64.75% 79.95% 
Rural 12.93% 7.73% 
Log Distance to Center 6.88 6.51 
Log Size 4.20 4.11 
Balcony 32.98% 43.00% 
Log High Standard Index 0.59 0.57 
Furnished 23.44% 26.33% 
Heating Included 23% 26% 
 
Table 4.2 shows that the dwelling units rented by Norwegians and Non-Norwegians are broadly 
comparable.  Non-Norwegians are more likely to live in the city center and are less likely to live in 
rural areas. Non-Norwegians are more likely to rent slightly smaller dwelling units and are more likely 
to have a balcony, rent a furnished apartment and have heating included in their rent. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
We now turn to the empirical implications of statistical discrimination in the rental market.  We begin 
by providing some evidence that there are group differences between Norwegians and Non-
Norwegians that landlords may use as the basis for statistical discrimination.  We then look at the 
empirical evidence for the implications of our stylized model.  First, we test whether those groups 
landlords may believe to be riskier are charged higher rents.  To test whether our results are due to 
unobserved taste preferences we construct an alternative treatment group, “first generation” 
Norwegians.   We then exploit a feature of the Norwegian tax code that encourages homeowners to 
rent out portions of their homes.  This has created a large group of small-scale landlords who cannot 
trade-off between risk and return in the same way as large-scale landlords.  Finally, we look at 
whether landlords trade-off between risk and return by considering the role of intermediation in the 
rental market. 
Differing Expectations 
Statistical discrimination requires that landlords have different beliefs over the expected returns or the 
expected variability of returns between Norwegians and Non-Norwegians. To see whether there is any 
readily observable evidence that supports different beliefs, we first note the unemployment rates 
between Norwegians and Non-Norwegians. The unemployment rate for Non-Norwegians is roughly 
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three times greater than for Norwegians (4.5% vs. 1.5%).  Knowledge of this fact might cause a 
landlord to believe that a Non-Norwegian will be less able to pay rent. Second, we obtained records 
from the tenant court for the greater Oslo region for the period January to May 2008.  The tenant court 
adjudicates claims between landlord and tenants.  Typically this will involve a landlord attempting to 
retain a part of the three-month deposit, required of all rental contracts, for non-payment or to repair 
damage to the dwelling unit. We obtained the names of the tenants and the landlords in all cases 
brought before the tenant court.  Names were classified as Norwegian or Non-Norwegian.  If there was 
any ambiguity the name was classified as Norwegian.  We found that cases involving obviously Non-
Norwegian tenants made up 39% (45 of 115) of the whole.  In the rental survey we find that Non-
Norwegians make up 27% (222 of 831) of the tenants in the greater Oslo area. These differences 
between groups provide some evidence that landlords may believe that the expected return or the 
variance of returns may differ between the two groups. 
 
Our theoretical approach suggests that the observed price of dwelling unit k will be a function of 
hedonic characteristics kx , contract terms iL  and, if statistical discrimination is present, group 
membership ig .   We follow standard practice in the hedonics literature and choose a semi-log 
specification, 
 , ,ln T T Tk i k i k i kp x g L uα β γ δ= + + + + , 
where β , γ and δ  are parameter vectors to be estimated and u is a well behaved error term. 
Regression models of this type are widely used when testing for statistical discrimination (Cain 1986). 
 
An implication of the stylized model is that if landlords have different expectations as regards the 
variability of returns between groups, they will require a higher expected return from the riskier group.  
Given the information on relative riskiness provided above, we expect that the coefficient for Non-
Norwegian tenants to be positive.  
 
The hedonic characteristics in x consist of a fairly complete description of the dwelling unit.  We 
control for location: whether the dwelling unit is in Oslo, whether it is proximate to the city center, 
whether it is in a rural area, the natural logarithm of the distance to the city center.  We control 
physical characteristics of the unit: log size (measured in square meters), the presence of a balcony, 
and an index which measures the degree to which the unit is finished to a “high standard”.  We also 
control for services included in the contract, L. These include whether or not the rent includes heating 
and whether or not the dwelling unit is furnished.   
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Finally we include a vector of characteristics that the landlord may use to classify individuals into 
groups. For each tenant, we include their age, whether or not they have university education, whether 
or not they are female, and our crucial policy variable, whether or not the tenant was born in Norway.  
We include dummy variables to indicate the presence of a spouse, children, parents, siblings or friends 
in the dwelling unit.  We also incorporate dummy variables to indicate whether the rent is being paid 
by someone other than the tenant, by their employer or by the municipality by way of social 
assistance. Table 5.1 summarizes the main regression results.  
 
Table 5.1.  OLS Results 
Variable Estimate (Robust t-statistic) 
0.242 Oslo (15.60)** 
0.189 
City Center (11.79)** 
-0.204 
Rural Area (7.61)** 
-0.010 
Log of Distance to City Center (1.44) 
0.297 
Log Size (m2) (14.55)** 
0.041 
Balcony (3.01)** 
0.078 
Log of High Standard Index (5.94)** 
0.009 
Furnished (0.58) 
-0.008 
Log of Heating (0.44) 
0.024 
Female (1.89) 
-0.000 
Age (0.59) 
-0.106 
Single (1.94) 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 5.1. (cont,) 
Variable Estimate (Robust t-statistic) 
-0.022 
Living with Spouse (0.41) 
0.078 
Living with Children (1.48) 
-0.240 
Living with Parents (1.95) 
-0.094 
Living with Siblings (1.26) 
0.230 
Living with Friends (4.21)** 
0.032 
University Educated (1.42) 
0.098 
Rent Paid by Others (3.40)** 
-0.205 
Rent Paid by Employer (1.45) 
0.081 
Rent Paid by Municipality (3.62)** 
0.069 
Non-Norwegian by birth  (3.65)** 
7.067 
Constant (60.72)** 
Number of Observations 2888 
R-squared 0.41 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The point estimate of the key variable, the dummy variable indicating a non-Norwegian tenant, is 
0.069.  The estimate is statistically significant at all conventional levels and is economically large. In 
other words, non-Norwegians are spending approximately 7% more than Norwegians on a ceteris 
paribus basis. This is consistent with statistical discrimination based on ethnic background as 
described above.  Interestingly, none of the other tenant specific information, such as age, gender or 
education, is statistically significant. 
 
Consistent with much of the previous hedonic literature, the physical characteristics of the dwelling 
unit capture much of the variation in price. Location variables are statistically significant and large.  
Being located in Oslo yields a 24% premium, being located in the city center yields a 19% premium 
and being located in a rural area results in a 20% discount.  As expected, the size of the unit, the 
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presence of a balcony and the fact that a unit is finished to a high standard are all positively and 
significantly associated with price. 
 
We see that the dummy variables that capture the effects of sharing the unit do not affect the rent 
significantly, apart from renting with friends. Renting with friends on the other hand has a statistically 
significant and large influence on rents, (e0.23 =  0,26). It is interesting to note the considerable 
differences when a third party pays rent. If the employer pays rent, the point estimate suggests a large 
discount, albeit one that is not statistically significantly different from zero. However, if the 
municipality pays rent, rents are 8% higher.  One possible explanation is that rent paid by employer is 
viewed as an extra guaranty all else equal, but aid from the municipality in the form of rental 
payments, may send a more mixed signal. 
Country of Origin 
Non-Norwegians are a heterogeneous group. Non-Norwegians can be from neighboring countries or 
from far away, both geographically and culturally. Landlords may believe that the variability of 
returns differs between these groups. We account for this diversity by extending the previous analysis.  
We divide the Non-Norwegian dummy into a series of continent of origin specific dummies: Africa, 
Asia/Oceania, America and Europe. 
 
Table 5.2 reports the results for the continent of origin dummies. In the interests of space, we only 
report estimates of the coefficients on the country of origin dummies. Coefficients on the remaining 
variables were virtually unchanged from the original specification.  
 
Table. 5.2. Continent of Origin Dummies 
 Estimate 
(Robust t-statistic) 
0.113 Africa (3.19)** 
-0.005 Asia/Oceania (0.15) 
0.038 America (0.73) 
0.050 Europe (2.37)* 
Observations 2888 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Our results show that tenants from Africa pay on average 11% more, again when controlling 
controlled for a wide array of apartment and individual specific characteristics.  The result is 
statistically significant at all conventional levels and economically large.  Tenants from Europe also 
pay 5% more on a ceteris paribus basis.  The effect is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Immigrants from Asia/Oceania and America do not appear to pay more, the coefficient estimates are 
smaller and are not statistically significant. 
First Generation Norwegians 
Results above may be due to unobservable heterogeneity between Norwegians and Non-Norwegians. 
For example, Non-Norwegians may value the attributes of dwelling units differently. Given the nature 
of the data, a direct test of this hypothesis is not possible.  Instead we construct an alternative 
treatment group, tenants who have both parents born outside of Norway. We presume that any 
unobservable taste differences between Norwegians and first generation Norwegians should be smaller 
than those between Norwegians and Non Norwegians. These “first generation” Norwegians 
presumably have comparable language skills and social knowledge via mandatory public schooling 
and (for males) compulsory military service. 
 
Estimating the hedonic regression above on a subsample comprised of “first generation Norwegians” 
and Norwegians, we find that the “first generation” Norwegians pay 7 percent more than Norwegians 
ceteris paribus.  The effect is statistically significant at all conventional levels and is economically 
important. Interestingly, the premium is of comparable magnitude to the estimated premium paid by 
Non-Norwegians above.  All other coefficients are similar to those in the original specification. This 
result is consistent with statistical discrimination. Moreover, this provides some cautious evidence that 
differences are not being driven by unobservable taste heterogeneity. 
Landlord Heterogeneity 
In a sample of existing rental contracts, statistical discrimination can take on different forms. As 
above, it may result in a landlord offering the same dwelling at different prices to members of different 
groups. However, if a given landlord has preferences such that the rent required to rent to a member of 
a particular group is sufficiently high, no contract with a member of that group will be struck. In the 
previous analysis we focused on completed contracts, now we try and find evidence of missing 
contracts by examining a special group of landlords. The Norwegian tax system encourages 
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homeowners to rent out part of their home2. This segment of the rental market, where landlord and 
tenant live under the same roof, is of special interest.  Renting out a single (or a small number of ) 
dwelling unit does not allow a landlord to diversify risk across tenants. Because of this, all else equal, 
landlords renting out a single unit require higher expected returns for a given level of risk than a 
landlord renting out multiple units.  As a result, tenants in the risky group should be able to rent an 
equivalent object from landlords who rent out multiple units, at a lower price.  The empirical 
implication is that fewer members of the group thought to have a higher variance should be observed 
renting from small-scale landlords. 
 
Table 5.3 shows the distribution of Norwegians and Non Norwegians in the different market segments, 
either living in the same building as the landlord or not. 
 
Table 5.3 
 Same Building 
(percent) 
Not Same Building 
(percent) 
Norwegian 808 (89) 1666 (84) 
Non-Norwegian 98 (11) 316 (16) 
Total 906 (100) 1982 (100) 
 
We see that Non-Norwegians are under represented relative to Norwegians amongst those landlords 
who share a roof with their tenants. The probability of renting in this segment is almost 50% higher for 
Norwegians (16 versus 11 percent). This difference is statistically significant. This provides some 
modest evidence that this group of landlords may set their reservation price for Non-Norwegians 
above the price asked by large scale landlords, such that Non-Norwegian tenants look elsewhere. 
 
Alternatively, those landlords who sign contracts with tenants they deem risky will demand a rental 
premium.  Table 5.4 shows the results of running the model on each landlord segment separately. 
 
                                                     
2 Rents are taxable income for landlords. In Norway landlords are divided according to size. A professional landlord is 
defined to be a landlord who rents of 5 objects or more. In this case net rents, that is rent minus incurred expenses are taxed 
as income. For small-scale landlords (less than 5 units) net rents are taxed as capital return (28 percent). A separate rule 
applies for renting out part of your own home (this rule exits to stimulate the supply side of the rental market), if the rental 
unit does not exceed 50 percent of the home, returns are tax exempt. 
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Table 5.4 
 Same Building Not Same Building 
0.044 0.068 Non-Norwegian (1.46) (3.05)** 
Number of Observations 906 1982 
R-squared 0.42 0.44 
 
Our results show that Non-Norwegians appear to pay more in both segments, 4.4% for co residents 
versus 6.8% in complementary segment. These findings are consistent with more careful screening by 
co resident landlords. 
Intermediation 
A landlord may use informal recommendations from friends and acquaintances as a means of 
mitigating risk. Though a landlord may have no preference for giving a rebate to the acquaintance of a 
friend, the stylized model above suggests a lower reservation price if a prospective tenant is thought to 
be of lower risk. 
 
The rental survey contains information on how a given dwelling unit was located. We assume that if 
the tenant found the rental object via the Internet or in a newspaper, the tenant and landlord had no 
prior knowledge of one another. Hence, the landlord may face, or believe they face, a higher risk than 
if they had found the tenant some other way, through work, friends or family. To this end, we include 
a dummy for third party intermediary in the hedonic specification above. This yields a statistically 
significant and economically large coefficient of 0.21. That is, the contracted rental price for a 
dwelling unit located via a third party is 21% percent higher ceteris paribus than a unit located via 
other means. As regards our key variable of interest, we find that once personal intermediation is 
accounted for, Non Norwegians pay on average 5.3 percent more than Norwegians.  The estimate is 
statistically significant at all conventional levels. 
6. Alternative Theoretical Approaches 
In the previous section we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that landlords statistically 
discriminate against Non-Norwegians. However, there are alternative theoretical approaches that may 
give rise to Non-Norwegians paying higher rents than Norwegians. We now investigate several 
alternative mechanisms by which this might occur. 
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Social Networks/Assimilation 
Finding a rental object involves search costs, and larger social networks may make these costs smaller. 
In general, Non Norwegians face higher search cost due to language and cultural barriers and due to 
less developed social networks. To see whether Non-Norwegians with presumably larger social 
networks and better language skills pay more for comparable dwelling units, we restrict our sample of 
Non-Norwegians to those who have lived in Norway for more than 10 years.  The intuition is simply 
that the social network of a recent arrival is expected to increase over time. Note that this reduces 
number of Non-Norwegians in our sample by over half (from 414 to 185).  Estimating the previous 
hedonic specification on this subsample yields a 4.2 percent differential between Non-Norwegians and 
Norwegians. The difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.  This provides some evidence 
in favor of the assimilation hypothesis, but the small sample size makes drawing definite conclusions 
difficult.   Evidence against the assimilation hypothesis comes from the previous results on “first-
generation” Norwegians. We found that “first-generation” Norwegians, despite being born and 
educated in Norway, pay a premium close to that of Non-Norwegians.  This suggests that the social 
network/ assimilation hypothesis cannot explain all of the results from the previous section. 
Tenure Length 
The analytical model presented above tells a story about landlords faced with incomplete information 
about rental risk, which they believe varies across groups. Because a rental contract is not a one shot 
game, tenants and landlords learn more about each other over the course of the rental contract.  As the 
tenant’s type is revealed, rent can be implicitly or explicitly adjusted; good tenants can be rewarded by 
rent changes that are lower than the market or legal limits. Hubert (1995) presents a model where 
presence of tenure security laws results in both pre- and post-contractual selection depending on agent 
characteristics. Furthermore, length-of-residence discounts tend to be present in rental markets 
(Goodman and M.Kawai 1985; Barker 2003; Goodman and Kawai 2003).   
 
The question of tenure length is important when comparing Norwegians to Non-Norwegians. Non-
Norwegians have on average shorter tenures (2.6 years compared to 3 for Norwegians) and miss out 
on discounts associated with longer tenure. In short, tenure length rather than statistical discrimination 
might explain the findings in the previous section.  To this investigate this hypothesis, we plot rent as a 
smoothed function of tenure length for the two groups in question. 
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Figure 6.1. Rent as a smoothed function of tenure length (Tricube smoothing) Rent in 
Norwegian krones and tenure length in years 
 
 
Consistent with previous work, we see that rent declines as tenure length increases. Both Norwegian 
and Non-Norwegian tenants benefit from discounts associated with longer tenures. The decline is 
strikingly similar between the two groups, but a price differential persists over time.  In other words, 
price differentials present at the beginning of a rental contract persist throughout the life of the 
contract.  Tenure length is clearly an important predictor of rent, but it does not rule out statistical 
discrimination. 
 
Alternatively, one could control for tenure length by introducing the natural logarithm of tenure length 
into the hedonic regression in the previous analysis.  This specification reduces the point estimate on 
the Non-Norwegian dummy to 0.06, but it remains highly significant. All other results are largely 
unchanged.   This suggests that the premium paid by Non-Norwegians is not satisfactorily explained 
by differences in tenure length.  
7. Conclusion 
Statistical discrimination may hurt individuals of disadvantaged groups, and compromise equal 
opportunity and basic human rights. It may also have an adverse effect on market efficiency. The 
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question of ethnic discrimination is particularly pressing in European countries, where recent 
immigration has created visible minority groups in what were previously largely homogenous 
populations with respect to culture and language. 
 
We have argued that rental markets are well suited for the study of discrimination.  In particular, they 
appear to confront far fewer empirical difficulties than labor markets.   First, much of the price 
variation in rental units can be explained by readily observed hedonic attributes, whose prices are 
plausibly exogenous to individual tenants.  Second, the confounding of rational underinvestment in 
labor market skills and discrimination seems less problematic in the rental market.  The range of 
available investments that a prospective tenant can make in “rental market skill” is far smaller than the 
range of available investments that a prospective employee can make.  This difference allows us to 
more easily obtain estimates of statistical discrimination. 
 
Our findings are consistent with the presence of statistical discrimination in the rental market. We find 
a premium of 6-7% for being a Non-Norwegian tenant. When we extend the analysis by considering 
continent of origin we find that tenants from Africa pay the largest premium, 11%. We also find that 
tenants born in Norway, but whose parents were born abroad pay a premium of 6.9%, which is directly 
comparable to the premium, paid by Non-Norwegians. These differences are economically important 
and are consistent with landlords using race to assign tenants to groups.  Moreover, consistent with the 
implications of our model, we find that Non-Norwegian tenants are underrepresented in market 
segments where we have reason to believe landlords may be more risk averse.  These findings provide 
some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that Non-Norwegians are experiencing statistical 
discrimination. 
 
However, some caution is required in drawing broad conclusions based on our results. Because our 
data consists of a simple cross-section, further study is required to cleanly establish causality. 
Specifically, we never directly observe the counterfactual, i.e. it would be desirable to observe the 
same rental unit rented by both a Norwegian and a Non-Norwegian tenant. But the fact that “first 
generation” Norwegians, e.g. those who differ in their ethnic background, but have broad and deep 
exposure to Norwegian language and institutions, appear to pay a rental premium that is comparable to 
that of Non-Norwegians.  This provides some modest evidence that the link between ethnicity and 
rental premium may be causal. 
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Appendix 
The Norwegian rental survey and the Norwegian rental market 
This appendix provides a brief overview of the Norwegian rental survey that forms the basis of the 
empirical exercise above.  We also provide some institutional detail on the Norwegian rental market. 
Norwegian Rental Survey 
The Norwegian rental survey began in 2005, and is conducted annually. Data used in this paper comes 
from the 2006 version of the survey is the result of interviews preformed during the period February to 
June 2006.  
 
A primary representative sample of 18 000 Norwegian residents was initially drawn from the register 
of all residents of Norway, conditional on not living in a self owned dwelling.  The sample is 
representative in the sense that it the Norwegian adult population regarding gender, age and 
geographical distribution (for further details see Belsby et al (2005)). However, past experience of the 
rental market survey show that non-response can be an issue for certain groups, notably younger 
tenants and residents of Oslo. To this end, these two strata were oversampled by drawing an additional 
2000 potential tenants in Oslo, and an additional 8000 young tenants. Table A.1 summarizes the 
sampling procedure. 
 
Table A.1 
Category Number of potential tenants 
Primary sample 18 000 
Oversampling of Oslo   2 000 
Oversampling of young households   8 000 
Total 28 000 
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Table A.2 summarizes reasons for non-response, and the number of renters found in the net sample. 
 
Table A.2 
Category Number Percent 
Sample (persons assigned for interview) 28 000  
Inadmissible (deceased/living abroad) 146  
Gross Sample 27 854 100 
Non-response (missing telephone number) 7 464 26.8% 
Other non response 4 572 16.4% 
Net sample (interview preformed) 15 818 56.4% 
Renters in net sample 5 169 32.4% 
 
Of this net sample of 5169 tenants, 3625 was uniquely identified with background information 
regarding socio-demographic information like gender, age, education level, and country of birth. 
Tenants in social housing and in student accommodation run by the government face rents defined at a 
political or administrative level. These rents need not be market rents, as a result these tenants (625) 
are excluded from the analysis.  
Institutional Detail 
Norway has several laws that govern the tenant landlord relationship. The law’s goal is to provide both 
parties with legal protection. In the following we will briefly outline the relevant paragraphs of the 
Norwegian Rental Law (NRL)3 that relate to price formation in the private rental market. 
 
The NRL divides rental contracts into two types: Time-limited and time-unlimited4. Time limited 
contracts are typically required to last at least 3 years, but exceptions are allowed and time-limited 
contracts of short length are often observed. In a time-limited contract, rents can be inflation adjusted 
yearly and rents can be renegotiated every third year. Tenants have the right to request that rents 
should be set to market rent, if the rent exceeds the market rent. In this respect the NRL is skewed 
towards the tenant. However, this clause is seldom invoked, and when invoked has largely involved 
social housing. Landlord protections in the NRL include the right to evict the tenant in case of contract 
default, and compensation for damaged property exceeding natural wear and tear. In practice, eviction 
involves considerable time and transaction costs for landlords.  
                                                     
3 The Norwegian Rental Law (Lov om Husleieavtaler- Lov  1999-03-26 http://www.lovdata.no/all/h1-19990326-017.html) 
4 The Norwegian union of tenants (Leieboerforeningen) estimates that less than 1 percent of all  contracts are time unlimited 
and we do not discuss them further. 
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The NRL explicitly states (paragraph 1.8) that discrimination based on ethnic background, nationality, 
religious belief or sexual orientation is illegal. Moreover the NRL explicitly references the more 
general Norwegian laws regarding discrimination the Antidiscrimination Law, ADL  
(diskrimineringsloven5) and the discrimination protection agency law, DPAL 
(diskrimineringsombudsloven6). 
 
Landlords pay taxes on rental income according to the scope of their operations. A professional 
landlord, defined to be a landlord that rents of 5 objects or more, pays income tax at the standard rate7 
on net rents (rents minus incurred expenses). For small-scale landlords (less than 5 units) net rents are 
taxed as capital return (28 percent). A separate rule applies for landlords renting out a part of their own 
home. In order to stimulate the supply side of the rental market, if the rental unit does not exceed 50 
percent of the house, then rental income is tax exempt. 
 
 
                                                     
5 Antidiscrimination Law (Lov om forbud mot diskriminering http://www.lovdata.no/all/h1-20050306-033.html) 
6 Lov om Likestilling- og diskrimineringsombutet og Likestillings-og diskrimineringsnemda http://www.lovdata.no/all/h1-
20050610-040.html) 
7 Marginal tax in Norway is capped at 48 percent. 
